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ABSTRACT 
SAINTSING, MATTHEW B., M.A., December 2015, Political Science 
A Tale of Two ‘Kenyas’: An African Case of Societal Securitization 
Director of Thesis: Brandon Kendhammer 
Coastal Kenya has been subjected to terror attacks with alarming frequency, and 
an active insurgency is on the rise. Dwindling security threatens the stability of Kenya, 
with the coast being imperative for tourism revenue. It is vital that the Kenyan 
government acts to provide security. This thesis explores why the government of Kenya 
chooses to engage in ethnic profiling of Somalis, instead of engaging the true causes of 
insecurity. Securitization theory provides the framework to understand the motivations of 
Kenyan security policies. This thesis argues that Kenyan authorities seek to securitize 
Kenyan society by scapegoating marginalized Somalis and Muslims. To gain a full 
picture of security, 25 semi-structured interviews were collected in Malindi, Kenya in 
June 2014. Kenyan citizens recognize that the government in Nairobi ought to provide 
security for all citizens. Only through exploring disconnects between citizen perceptions 
of security and official policies can a full picture of security be understood. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Security in Kenya has been deteriorating. Since 2011, the Somalia based terror 
group Al-Shabaab has launched a series of coordinated and deadly attacks against the 
Kenyan people. Although the Coast and Northeastern provinces have experienced the 
majority of the violence, one of the most publicized attacks occurred in a popular 
shopping mall in Nairobi. The Westgate Mall shooting left nearly 70 dead and more than 
170 wounded. Despite the plethora of media attention the Westgate attack received, Al-
Shabaab has concentrated their efforts predominately in areas that have high 
concentrations of Muslims. Mombasa, in addition to being home of the largest port in 
East Africa, has been a focal point for Al-Shabaab. Several grenade, improvised 
explosive device, and targeted killings have occurred in the once sought after tourist 
epicenter. Other attacks have been launched in Lamu, Mandera, and most recently 
Garissa, despite being less populated these communities have been forced to bury their 
neighbors and loved ones in droves. The dwindling security situation forces the 
government to act, and to provide security for its citizens. 
Security as a unit of analysis requires a framework to understand the motivations 
and foundations behind security policies. Securitization theory provides the framework to 
explore the rationale behind security policies. The central question this thesis investigates 
is why does Kenya--ostensibly a democracy—engage in security policies that are 
exclusive, and predicated on ethnicity? By investigating the motivations and rationale 
behind abusive and undemocratic security practices, this project brings to light how 
ethnicity is the guiding force behind official security strategies in Kenya. The political 
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dimensions of ethnicity are not hidden behind the scenes, nor do they exist only within 
the context of contentious politics. By analyzing Kenyan security operations and speech-
acts of politicians, it is clear that Kenyan authorities are not prepared to engage 
marginalized Kenyans in hopes of swaying them from the grip of Al-Shabaab. Instead 
authorities ‘play the ethnic’ card that portrays Christians and Kikuyu as “true” Kenyans, 
while Muslims and Somalis are portrayed as the enemy. 
The authorities portray ethnic Somalis as being synonymous with terrorism. The 
mere act of speaking this notion creates the conditions that allow Kenya to engage in 
security operations that pit Somalis verses “peaceful” Kenyans. While analysis of 
security policies and discourse that is referred to as speech-acts is crucial in 
understanding the political dimension of security, it is incomplete. To gain a full 
spectrum of security, the perceptions and attitudes of individual actors—citizens—is 
required. Governments that do not take into account the security wants and needs of their 
citizens fail to provide one of the most basic public goods. 
The research employed is qualitative, building off of and contributing to, 
securitization theory, as well as using data collected from interviews. Through 
investigating the actions and policies Kenya has employed in the wake of attacks, they 
are securitizing identity (and thus society) by victim blaming Somali-Kenyans and 
conflating Muslim with terrorist. While scholarship on on conflict and terrorism in Africa 
is bountiful, securitization theory has been an under utilized tool in the Africanists’ 
Rolodex.  The Kenyan case furthers Securitization theory and builds on its ability to 
travel to disparate regions outside of Europe. 
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In order to fully evaluate the efficacy of state responses, interviews were collected 
regarding the perceptions of security. Chapter 3 who uses data from 25 semi-structured 
interviews collected in Malindi, Kenya during June of 2014. 13 men and 12 women—all 
Muslims—were interviewed about their perceptions of security. Malindi Kenya sits 
almost halfway between Mombasa and Lamu counties, two areas that have experienced 
several attacks, and has a predominantly Muslim population. Many citizens of Malindi 
have economic and social ties to Somalia, in addition to living under constant threat from 
Al-Shabaab. The sample is reflective of the types of people that were most accessible. 
Nearly all had some connection to the service industry. This is not particularly surprising 
or problematic given that Malindi contains pristine beaches and has been a prominent 
tourist destination. Snowballing was not used to increase the sample. Potential 
interviewees were approached either at work, or in public spaces, such as outdoor 
markets. Not using snowballing was a conscious choice. It is possible that individuals 
interviewed could tell their friends and family about the questions and guide them to 
specific answers that are either advantageous for them, or that may be perceived by me as 
being the “correct” responses. 
My intention of the sample is not to be generalized to the rest of the country. 
Rather it represents ethnic and religious minorities who look to the government and 
politicians in Nairobi to provide security and to quell the violence. Political power has 
been concentrated with people of Kikuyu ethnicity. The security policies and operations 
have been have been employed by Kikuyu for Kikuyu. It is important in a democracy 
(even one that is partial, and fragile such as Kenya’s) that marginalized people have their 
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voices heard. This sample represents citizens who are stuck in between being at the 
mercy of Al-Shabaab, and their own government. 
This thesis explores two dimensions of security in Kenya: the responses of the 
state, and perceptions of security by its citizens. The Kenyan state can no longer stand 
idly by while an international group continues to terrorize its citizens. In order to 
investigate the motivations and reasoning of particular security policies, Securitization 
theory (The Copenhagen School) is employed. While Chapter 1 will go into detail what 
Securitization theory is and why it will used in this thesis, it is important to clarify some 
of its basics. Securitization theory, coming out of the IR tradition, seeks to explain how 
and why certain issues get pushed into a realm of exceptional politics—that requires 
exceptional responses. Issues that are labeled ‘issues of national security’ do not emerge 
out of nothing; they are constructed overtime, and like other dimensions of politics, favor 
certain groups over others. Those who are able to pull the levers of government control 
the discourse and actions of security. 
Securitization, as a lens, allows for threats to be treated not as threats, but of 
political issues, which become securitized. As a theory, securitization looks beyond the 
urgency that authorities sell to their audience and asks why a particular issue becomes 
securitized and not another. Authorities frame security threats in such a way that to do 
nothing would be neglectful to their duties. Securitization provides researchers and 
analysts a framework to critically examine the motivations behind an act of security. 
Securitization theory as a framework, which is discussed in detail in chapter 1, brings the 
political back into focus. Authorities that securitize certain issues-- that are deemed as 
dangerous threats—do so out of political gain. The fallacy that a threat rises to the top of 
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a security agenda requires a substantial response if brought to light using securitization 
theory. Securitization as a framework is used as a critical took to understand the political 
dimension of an issue that is presented as an apolitical threat. 
Security studies have concentrated on international security, and as such, has 
focused on international variables. This thesis scales security and conflict down to the 
state level. By investigating domestic institutions and actors, this thesis seeks to shift the 
burden of security away from international organizations, transnational institutions, and 
powerful states and onto the shoulders of governments that are charged with providing 
security, one of the most basic of public goods that governments ought to provide. 
Chapter 2 applies Securitization theory to Kenya. Through the lens of Securitization, this 
thesis argues that the current Kenyatta regime seeks to securitize identity by extending 
the coercive arm of the state and targeting and scapegoating marginalized ethnic and 
religious minority groups. 
The aim of this thesis is to explore disconnects between Kenyan state policy and 
discourse, and frames of individual Kenyan citizens. Disconnects between what official 
state policy is and what marginalized citizens expect highlight the priorities of elites. 
Chapter 1 investigates competing conceptualizations of security, and lays the theoretical 
framework for analyzing the security policies of the Kenyan state. Kenya has engaged in 
policies and discourse, through speech-acts, that align with societal securitization. 
Chapter 2 describes Kenyan policies since independence. 
Chapter 3 explores security expectations of citizens of Coastal Kenya. Twenty-
five Semi-structured interviews were collected from Muslims in Malindi, Kenya. Coastal 
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citizens overwhelmingly identify that the government in Nairobi shoulders the burden 
of providing security. Economic security is of utmost concern. Realizing tourism is a 
vital industry, security must be provided to ensure tourists flock to Kenya’s pristine 
beaches and resorts along the coast. These perceptions are important regarding security 
policy. If a minority population feels they are marginalized and not of significance to the 
state, there is no implicit trust. The ability for a country to provide security is predicated 
on support from the local populatio
 
 
	  
12 
CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUALIZING SECURITY 
Security has different meanings to different people. The notion of a citizen having 
security indicates a certain level of safety. Security has evolved from Individuals 
demanding protection from competing clans, to safety from other politically organized 
bodies—states, to eventually safety from over-bearing government intrusion. For an 
individual, security is a necessary facet for modern human existence. For those who stand 
at the levers of governance, security is something that is to be provided, as well as 
something that is to be guaranteed. This broad conceptualization of an ambiguous term 
includes every actor of politics. 
In order for security to be analyzed, it must be defined. This thesis defines 
security as “The move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and 
frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics”.1 The logic is 
clear: if ‘threats’ are deemed exceptional and outside of the purview of “regular” politics 
then security and securitization (the solutions) can operate outside of normal political life. 
This chapter discusses various conceptualizations of security, and puts forth a framework 
for understanding how states may grip with instances of “insecurity”. By describing 
trends and popular theories of security, this chapter lays the groundwork for investigating 
how the Kenyan state seeks to securitize as a response to insecurity caused by Al-
Shabaab, via the Copenhagen School. There are however, competing theories and 
frameworks, for understanding security. Before delving into securitization, I examine 
other possible lenses of security. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). Security: a new framework for analysis. 
Lynne Rienner Publishers. P. 23.  
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Human Security 
Within International Relations, a new framework has been established; human 
security. Human Security breaks from the I.R. tradition of state-centric 
conceptualizations of security. Instead, it is primarily of concern for the welfare and 
safety of individuals. Once thought to be a new-dawn for security analysts, Human 
Security has proven to be too vague to be a shift of analysis of action. First introduced in 
Norway in 1988, ‘Human Security’ seeks to serve the identities of liberal democratic 
states, as well as the coffers of NGOs. 
The ‘Human Security’ network (HSN) that emerged, spearheaded by Norway and 
Canada2, promote human security internationally. Instead of concentrating on security of 
states, Human Security seeks to place emphasis on security of the individual. The pivot 
away from the security of states’ borders and institutions include access to basic 
necessities required to sustain human life. Water, food, and shelter are of particular 
concern for proponents of Human Security. Discourse and action surrounding Human 
Security became grounded in 1994 when the United Nations Human Development Report 
(HDR) embraced the title New Dimensions of Human Security.3 Despite the term being 
vague and ambiguous, organizations such as the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) champion the language of Human Security. 
Discourses of Human Security that are conflated with development serve the 
organizations that advocate for it. Strength of the term is its potential to mobilize actors 
throughout the international system. It can unite academics, activists, and political actors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Other observing states include Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, 
Slovenia, Switzerland and Thailand, and South Africa.  
3 United Nations Development Programme (HDR), New Dimensions of Human Security 
(New York: Oxford University Press), 1994 
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in hopes of yielding tangible results that ultimately improve the lives of individuals. The 
term is the glue binds a community of states, and seeks to divert funds and other 
resources away from traditional security concerns towards issues, which have 
conventionally been housed under efforts of international development.4 When 
development is securitized the meaning becomes much too wide to implement 
meaningful policy. The lines between Human Security and human rights become blurred. 
Labels such as human rights and Human Security can be employed without providing 
long-lasting positive change for its citizens.5 
The marriage between Human Development and Human Security pushes the 
boundaries of security studies. HIV/AIDS has been securitized under a Human Security 
narrative. This challenges the traditional notion of security analyses in that military 
security does not hold in the balance. Seemingly apolitical issues can be breathed into 
spheres of security. Infectious diseases have been securitized being that extremely deadly 
ones pose a global threat. Malaria, Dengue fever, as well as HIV/AIDS have been 
securitized by Western states and the World Health Organization (WHO) The WHO, 
backed by Western powers, is charged with the governance and management of global 
health.6 There is no doubt that HIV/AIDS in the Global South can ‘threaten’ economies 
and destabilize societies. It is also widely accepted that the solutions of this epidemic lie 
in various levels of political organization. Distinctions must be drawn between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Paris, Roland. "Human security: Paradigm shift or hot air?." International security 26, 
no. 2 (2001): 87-102. 
5 Booth, Ken. Theory of world security. Vol. 105. Cambridge University Press, 2007. 
6 Davies, Sara E. "Securitizing infectious disease." International Affairs 84, no. 2 (2008): 
295-313. 
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practitioners and students of international politics. By pushing issues of development 
and global health into the realm of security, activists and NGOs garner attention, which 
may result in increased funding and awareness. 
Practitioners are not neutral investigators of politics. Actors to consciously elicit a 
particular outcome can speak specific issues into the world of security as a method. 
Within this conceptualization, any issue can be one of ‘security’ as long as there are 
individuals and organizations that wish for a particular outcome. Employing Human 
Security as a lens for analysis is vacuous given its vague and increasing widening. 
Why National Security? 
National security is a consequence of anarchy at the international level. The 
responsibility to ensure the state is secure falls to the shoulders of the state itself. This is 
because the state itself remains the primary actor in international relations (p.82).7 If a 
state determines that they have a situation, which requires security, they can only look 
inward. The state not only has the opportunity to secure itself, it has the responsibility to 
do so. Sweden and the United Kingdom have the same task as Sri Lanka and Lebanon; 
state survival. This notion of self-help stems from realism, a theory of international 
relations, in which the structure of a system rather than the process of learning and 
interaction explain state behavior.8 The systemic condition of anarchy enshrines that 
states must help themselves. State strength has no impact on the condition of anarchy, 
which privileges and burdens states simultaneously. The lack of a centralized global 
government prohibits states from petitioning another entity with institutional power to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 David Singer, J. "The level-of-analysis problem in international relations." World 
Politics 14, no. 01 (1961): 77-92. 
8 Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power 
politics." International organization 46, no. 02 (1992): 391-425. 
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govern individual states. Such an arrangement would mimic the structures of a federal 
system. States have remained the primary actor in international politics, and anarchy is 
the by-product of the international system. It logically follows that states are unique 
actors, which are linked to being the masters of their own destiny, or sovereignty. 
Security and sovereignty are linked at the international level. The Thirty Years 
War, and the subsequent Treaty of Westphalia, ushered in the era of sovereignty. Among 
the basic tenants of sovereignty is that states carry the burden for security of its citizens. 
Sovereignty and security are entangled with one another. Many analysts’ and scholars’ 
conceptualization of sovereignty and security are that the two phenomena are separate. 
Samuel Makinda posits that security, at the global level, is a reflection of sovereignty9. 
Global security once meant the process by which states ensured their survival. This was 
characterized by the bi-polar system of the “First” and “Second” worlds. Terminology of 
states being located in an ordering system represented numerically has been melded with 
geopolitical class structure; mainly a “Global North” and “South”. Whether ordered 
numerically or geographically, classification of states is placeholders for those who are 
located at the center, periphery, or semi-periphery of the international system.10  States 
outside of Europe, mainly located in the “Global South”, never had the opportunity to 
forge nations and draw borders according to local practices and norms. That process was 
done for them by colonial powers; the effects of which are still being observed. The 
North-South divide is a way to determine where power is vested and where resources go. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Makinda, Samuel M. "Sovereignty and global security." Security Dialogue 29, no. 3 
(1998): 281-292. 
10 Buzan, Barry. "New patterns of global security in the twenty-first 
century."International Affairs) (1991): 431-451. 
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All states have sovereignty, but the strength of the state itself is telling as to how and if 
they are able to secure themselves. 
Sovereignty is conceptualized as being empirical and juridical. Empirical 
sovereignty occurs when the state is willing and able to provide the goods and services a 
state ought to provide. This normative dimension of sovereignty permeates throughout 
the current global system. States in the Global South are expected to act as a state should. 
One of the most basic goods states ought to provide to its citizens is security. The 
expectation of the new states, which were plunged onto the international stage at the 
dawn of independence, to govern and compete internationally was not realistic. Suddenly 
the onus for development, governance, and security fell to the shoulders of the emerging 
post-colonial state. The autocratic nature of governance in ‘new’ post-colonial states has 
contributed to the identification of the puzzle that if states are to provide security, why 
have some not been able, or unwilling to provide security? Juridical sovereignty is 
constructed at the international level. The legal right of individual states to exist is rooted 
in other states recognizing that state. The international dimension does impact whether a 
geographical area will be enshrined with the rights of statehood. This is how the world 
has witnessed an Eritrea and South Sudan emerging in 1993 and 2011, respectively but 
not an independent Somaliland. New states can bear out of the dissolution of a parent-
federalized state, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, or they can be carved out of an 
established state, such as Kosovo and East Timor. The method of how states gain 
sovereignty has no impact on that once they step foot onto the international stage, the 
shift from being securitized to securitizing occurs instantaneously. Security cannot be 
provided if a state has juridical sovereignty, but lacks empirical sovereignty. The system 
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of anarchy and the international community recognizing Yemen, Somalia, and Central 
African Republic as having juridical sovereignty does not a strong state make. These 
states lack empirical sovereignty, in that they are unable or unwilling to provide the basic 
needs of individuals to its citizens. A state cannot secure anything if they have juridical, 
but not empirical sovereignty. A country that has juridical, but lacks empirical 
sovereignty equals a failing state. States that have juridical and empirical sovereignty 
employ different methods of securitization in the name of national security. 
Ethnic Security Dilemma 
Political conflicts have led scholars to apply ‘The Security Dilemma’ to 
interethnic strife. Security is a political goal. Instances of insecurity are constructed, and 
emerge when discourse is centered on, at the very least, a perceived threat. Security as a 
concept has been studied at the international level. Barry Posen (1993) borrows ‘the 
security dilemma’ from the International Relations (IR) theory of Realism to explain 
when and why some ethnic groups engage in violence. His application of ‘the security 
dilemma’ to Serbs and Croats within the former Yugoslavia, as well as Russians and 
Ukrainians in Eastern Ukraine, highlight the state-centricity of this particular lens. 
Posen’s findings suggest Serb-Croat violence is more likely to occur than Russian-
Ukrainian violence11. This is due to the distribution of Serbs in Croatia, coupled with the 
disastrous history between these two groups. Through this conceptualization the security 
of ethnic Serbs in Croatia can only be reached by a Serbian military response12. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Posen, Barry R. "The security dilemma and ethnic conflict." Survival 35, no. 1 (1993): 
P. 42. 
12 Ibid. 
	  	  	  	  	  
	  
19 
application of ‘The Security Dilemma’ to explain ethnic conflict lacks the ability to be 
generalized, and exported to other cases. 
The cases selected for Posen’s analysis meet the precondition of anarchy, which 
does not exist in other instances of ethnic conflict. Serbia and Croatia, like Ukraine and 
Russia enjoy sovereignty. Serbs and Croats existed under the umbrella of Yugoslavia, an 
amalgam constructed by Europe following World War I. The borders of Yugoslavia, 
while constructed, benefited from sovereignty. The collapse of Yugoslavia in 1992 
propelled Serbs and Croats in a state of anarchy. Similarly, the fall of the former Soviet 
Union ushered several Eastern European states onto the international stage. Ukraine 
became a sovereign state, independent of a Soviet Russia, in 1990.13 Ukrainians and 
ethnic-Russians alike fell under the state apparatus of a new independent Ukraine. States 
serve the purpose of being able to house various types of people. Theoretically, 
individuals within an aggrieved group can petition the state. If the state apparatus has 
either dissolved, or otherwise absent, the onus of security falls to the groups themselves. 
Border changes are rare. The collapse of Yugoslavia and USSR are exceptional and are 
not the rule. This application explains ethnic conflict in groups that have been thrust into 
anarchy. 
Anarchy lowers the cost of collective action. The absence of state apparatuses 
(such as defense nodes, legal institutions, etc...) shifts the burden of security to the 
shoulders of the group. Groups such as the Séléka rebels in the Central African Republic, 
ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and the Taliban in Afghanistan have assumed responsibility for 
security over its claimed territory and the people living within. These examples highlight 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 July 16th, 1990 the Ukrainian parliament declared the right of the self-determination of 
Ukraine. 
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the group as the unit of analysis. Sub-national groups do not have access to a set of 
legitimate sovereign governing tools. Applying ‘the security dilemma’ to groups that do 
have access to the state such as, the Tutsi led, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the 
Kikuyu of Kenya is not useful given that they have access to the military. Posen admits 
that ‘the security dilemma’ becomes more powerful when groups are, more or less, equal 
militarily14. Governments assume the responsibility for security and as such sub-national 
groups, which cause ‘insecurity’, can never be equal militarily. Moreover, domestic 
policies and laws can be methods of employing violence and conflict. A different 
analytical lens is required to identify and investigate how and why states engage in such 
practices. 
Securitization Theory 
 Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde argue that securitization possesses three 
dimensions.15  Together the following units construct the foundation for the utilization of 
securitization theory as a framework for understanding security policies and actions: 
First, there must be a referent. The threat that is deemed by the authorities to be of utmost 
importance is the referent. Without the referent, there is no existential threat that 
pressures authorities to act. Those who reach at the lever of securitization are the 
securitizing actors. The securitizing actors are the authorities that securitize an issue; they 
are the actors that usher in securitization of a “threat” by speaking it into existence. 
Finally there is the audience. The audiences are functional actors, which are distinct from 
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  Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). Security: a new framework for analysis. 
Lynne Rienner Publishers. P. 38.	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the referent, or the securitizing actor, yet they can dictate the dynamics of 
securitization. Functional actors should be viewed as the constituency of securitization; 
they are whom the securitization is done for. Without these three dimensions 
securitization theory cannot be used to understand what drives security policies. 
For states to securitize there must be, or at the very least perceived to be, threats. 
There are various intimidations, which have been constructed and framed as being 
threatening to the state, and its citizens. The question of what security is, and the answers 
that follow, reveal that certain issue areas become securitized. Agents of the state have 
the ability of breathing issues into the sphere of security by stating so. 16 This ability 
legitimizes certain actions that are considered politics as a necessity, due to its impending 
‘threat’. The following are the five areas issues within the Copenhagen School (CS), 
which can become securitized. 
The military security agenda represents the most traditional version of 
securitization. The social contract between those who govern, and are governed requires 
an entity of the state that guarantees security from external and internal threats. Threats, 
which require a military response, reflect a sincere fear of an attack. Following World 
War II, the Japanese military has fallen wayside to the importance of their growing 
economy. National security was not a priority for decades after the American occupation 
of Japan. This was for two reasons. First, the Yoshida Doctrine that Japan adopted 
following WWII emphasized development and economic importance. Secondly, America 
established bases on Japan and surrounding territories. The American military was filling 
a void that the Japanese sought not to fill. There has, however, been a resurgence of 
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Japanese military securitization. The threat of North Korean aggression has laid a 
foundation for Japan to increase their military, albeit slowly.17 The threat of missiles from 
Pyongyang has given Japan the opportunity to invest and grow their military. 
Environmental security is the newest and one of the most controversial spheres of 
securitization. Discourse surrounding the environment has only been in existence since 
1972 when the U.N. hosted their Conference on the Human Environment.18 The 
environmental sphere is different than the other four mentioned because its roots are 
located outside of the realm of politics. Scientists and research institutions ask questions 
that the natural world answers. The political realm is entered when discourse is 
concentrated around responsibility, response, and reaction, to environmental situations, 
which hamper the continued evolution of human civilization. The environmental and 
military spheres can be conflated. The symbol of American military power, the Pentagon, 
has a report discussing why climate change is linked to national security. 19 The depletion 
of non-renewable energy sources falls within the realm of environmental security. 
Chernobyl, like Fukushima illicit concern for nuclear energy and the questioned stability 
of its production. Both of these locations tie together the reality of crisis, and the response 
of a government to ensure they are protected from such a calamity. 
Economic security is controversial and political in nature. The political structure 
is to anarchy, what the economic structure is to the free market, domestically. Market 
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18 Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde. Security: a new framework for analysis. 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998. 
19 Davenport, Coral. “Pentagon Signals Security Risks of Climate Change” The New York 
Times. (New York City, NY) October, 13th, 2014.  
	  	  	  	  	  
	  
23 
oriented entities, such as firms and other mercantilists; view the state as having the 
responsibility to protect the ability of individuals, and firms alike, to accumulate wealth. 
Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde identify two other positions within the economic security 
sector; Liberals and Socialists. Liberals view economic rights as most inherent20. Social 
issues and the economy are entwined for liberals, and those who engage in discourse of 
economic securitization, do so because the goal are to establish ‘rules of the game’ that 
foster mobility within national economies.21 Casteneda finds that Sierra Leone has 
engaged in the securitization of development following their civil war from 1991-2002.22 
The attempted ‘trickle-down’ effect of security of the economic sector (development), to 
the social sector has been practiced in post-conflict countries, but has also been met with 
skepticism and critiques by scholars and politicians alike. 
Political security being a confusing concerned with threats of state sovereignty. 
Parsing out the political sphere from any others presented is problematic. Securitization 
cannot be divorced from politics. When discussing the economic or societal spheres, one 
is really discussing the “political-economic” sphere, or the “political-societal” sphere.23 
Lines are blurred with the political and other spheres. The military and political spheres 
were connected when United States invaded Iraq in March of 2003. American military 
was used to solve the political security threat of Iraq producing weapons of mass 
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destruction (WMDs).24 To truly separate the political sphere from others is to ask the 
critical question of what is politics. The answer to this question, while an important one, 
is not the focus of this thesis. Since the Peace of Westphalia, the main actor in 
international politics has been the state. Threats against the organizational institutions and 
processes of the state are threats to political security. 
Societal security is the securitization of those with a specific identity. A collective 
group of individuals who share a greater identity can be considered a nation. The nation, 
as a unit of analysis for securitization is a pivot from securitization of the state. 
Securitizing using the institutions, practices and norms has fallen to the shoulders of both 
the military and political security sectors. Nations like other societies, are not fixed 
entities like states are. They are not bound by occupying a physical space limited by 
borders. Society is not bound by the constraints of a state.25 There is a logical difference 
between security of Kurdistan, and of Kurds. Within the Iraqi context, Kurdistan refers to 
the semi-autonomous region in the North Eastern provinces of the country. Kurds, 
however, are those who identify as Kurdish, many of which live outside of Iraqi 
‘Kurdistan’.  If society is about identity, it must follow that societal securitization is to 
secure an identity. Societal securitization has been applied to the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. The perceived threat of Jewish and Israeli identity has led to a “Societal security 
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dilemma”26. The Israeli state seeks to securitize Jewish identity and Israeli nationalism 
by suppressing Palestinians. 
Since sectors that require securitization are constructed, there must be a target 
audience that the securitization process seeks to legitimize the actions. The “audience” is 
an ambiguous term, which can take on different meanings depending on context. When 
the United States sought to securitize airline travel, the immediate audience was the 
droves of travelers that American airports experienced every day. While it is true that 
architects of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) were charged with 
increasing security for airline passengers, the broader audience is much broader. Since 
the United States is a democracy, the audiences are the voters. An electorate is not likely 
to elect leaders that cannot or do not provide adequate security. For democracies that 
require a plurality to win an election, the audiences are potential voters. For politicians 
seeking to gain or retain office, the audience is as many people as possible, so as to 
increase their chance of support. In a more authoritarian context, the audiences are those 
who ensure survival of the regime. Under less politically open regimes, the audience is 
narrowed to oligarchs, which have a vested interest in the status-quo. The size of the 
audience is dependent on the regime type. 
Proponents of the Copenhagen School, most notably Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, 
and Jaap de Wilde, sought to widen security studies, but CS theory has not been without 
criticism. Wilkenson identifies that Securitization theory contains a “Westphalian 
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straitjacket”27. She contends that similar institutions, norms, bind not all states and 
practices commonly found in liberal Western democracies. Exposing securitization 
theory as Eurocentric presents the question of is this theory applicable to non-European, 
non-western states. She attempts to apply CS theory to Kyrgyzstan’s ‘Tulip Revolution’ 
of 2005. Kyrgyzstan, a weak and floundering state, has been under the influence of 
Russia even after the fall of the former Soviet Union. She finds that the relationship 
between speech and action, that CS is predicated on, did not take place in Kyrgyzstan in 
the months preceding the revolution.28 Instead of emerging security actors, who are able 
to mobilize and frame threats as an issue area that requires “securitization”, competing 
narratives at the local and national level may exist and operate simultaneously. As in 
major I.R. theories, CS privileges the state as the primary actor. ‘The state’ cannot alone 
solve security problems. Various states with disparate histories and formations all have 
the burden of security. The next logical question is the security of what, exactly? It is 
with this premise that states begin to securitize issues. 
The international community securitizes issues and groups when it is seen as a 
threat globally. Sub-national groups can be formed out of the absence of a governing 
authority. Somali pirates are a group that has been ‘securitized’ by the international 
community. The discourse on piracy in the Gulf of Aden has shifted at the international 
level. Piracy off the coast of Somalia has garnered the attention of the international 
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community since 2008, when pirates began to seize vessels carrying oil29. Piracy in 
Somalia, like potential infectious disease outbreaks, exist independent of normal politics 
into a sphere of special politics. Special politics calls for irregular, yet legitimate actions. 
These issues are malleable and security discourse is invoked when it serves economic or 
political advantages. 
States securitize what is perceived to be an outside threat; however, some ‘threats’ 
come from within. The 1989 student-led protests in Tiananmen Square were condemned 
and rejected as being revolutionary in nature. Official estimates range from 200 to 300 
people killed at the hands of the Chinese state. Student protests are a staple in democratic 
countries. The securitization of student protests served the Chinese state. Democracies, 
autocracies, and regimes somewhere between all engage in securitization. CS has focused 
heavily on Europe, and democratic states. Securitization of Tiananmen Square illustrates 
how securitization theory has abilities to transcend diverse regions of the world, and 
among disparate regime types. 
Within CS there is no room for actors other than states to securitize. The CS 
privileges the state as its unit of analysis. First, CS was developed and applied to I.R. The 
field of I.R. is concerned with the relationships between and among states. It is therefore 
reasonable and expected that a theory conceptualized under this cannon would be applied 
at the state level. Ultimately I.R. scholars, particularly theorists, seek to explain 
individual behavior. Individuals pulling the levers of governance control the state. The 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 is viewed as a unilateral action by the American state against 
another. This does not suggest, however, that the action was not a result of individuals; 
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namely George W. Bush and others in the administration. Anyone can claim anything to 
be an issue of security, but securitization occurs when those in power utilize the levers of 
governance to provide ‘safety’ from a threat. Since comparative politics focuses on 
domestic structures and actors, individuals in power (or those who control the levers of 
the state) are of concern to the sub-field. Also of concern to comparative politics are 
citizens. Individuals, which make up the nation, and those living on the periphery, are 
crucial to politics, and the study thereof. While ‘securitization theory’ has the ability to 
explain why states securitize certain issues, it cannot be applied to individual frames of 
security. 
African Security 
Security research has been concentrated mainly on international relations (I.R.). 
Applying I.R. theory to Africa has proved to be testing.30 I.R. theories do not, however, 
take into account how individuals frame security when faced with possible threats. 
Security studies as a discipline remains state-centric and that security as a term is one 
which has can have disparate meanings and changing norms.31Researchers and policy 
makers alike should take into account the wants and expectations of the people whom 
live with their recommendations and actions. By using coastal Kenya as a case study, this 
paper seeks to fill the gap on security research. 
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The scholarship concerning security within African states operates at the state 
level and above. Security at the state-level can be promoted via international 
organizations, of which the African Union (AU), is paramount. In May 2004, (AU) 
birthed a Peace and Security Council (PSC). This 15-member organization, must meet 
certain criteria before being called to promote peace and security.32 While research on the 
PSC is still in its infancy, Williams finds that their efficacy comes into question as they 
have never been mobilized for military intervention.33 The AU has, however, mobilized 
missions to promote peace and to provide security. The AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) 
mobilized some 3,000+ AU soldiers, mostly from Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South 
Africa, to build peace and promote security in the central African country. Eventually 
partnering with the United Nations, AMIB was able to quell violence before it started 
since 2003 Burundi was on the verge of collapse. From 2004-2007 the AU Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS) sought to make peace in Darfur. While this proved to be the chance for 
the AU to promote peace and security while an ongoing conflict was taking place, AMIS 
did not rise to the occasion. The UN took over control of the mission in December of 
2007. One last AU mission worth mentioning is the ongoing mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM). Having been in place since 2007, AMISOM has been charged with 
promoting security in Mogadishu in addition to supporting dialogue for reconciliation.34 
While the AU and its sub-regional partners are important for peacebuilding and 
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peacemaking within the continent, these interventions only occur after citizens of these 
countries have been living in a state of insecurity for quite some time. By the time 
international organizations provide support to suppress violence, scores of individuals 
have perished, or at the least, their lives are in danger. 
The above, while important to security situations of African states, lacks an 
important facet. Marginalized communities exist in every society, yet not all 
marginalized group fears for their lives. Coastal Kenya offers the opportunity to glimpse 
into the psyche of citizens who have traditionally been sidelined by their national 
government. Individual security frames take into account how people in their own 
country view the efficacy of their government. Recalling that security is a public good 
afforded by governments, the perceptions about the provision of security shed light onto 
how a particular community is prioritized by its parent government. 
Individual frames of security areaway to measure perceptions of governance. 
Since the burden of security falls upon states, individuals who live under conditions of 
insecurity, whether perceived or ‘real’, are instructive as to how they are treated by the 
state. 
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CHAPTER 2: SOCIETAL SECURITIZATION IN KENYA 
While the previous chapter focused on security and securitization, this chapter 
will apply Securitization theory to the case of Kenya. Like other forms of securitization, 
Kenyan authorities engage in societal Securitization through speech-acts. Securitization, 
as framework, does not exist without governments breathing it into life. Without a doubt, 
Al-Shabaab is a legitimate, tangible threat, however, the Kenyan government does not 
securitize the Somali based terrorist group. The conflation of Somalis and Muslims with 
Al-Shabaab, and therefore terror, creates the “reality” of the majority of Kenyans are 
peaceful. Somalis and Muslims are independent of greater Kenyan society being that they 
are the “true” threat. Authorities control the discourse on security. The speech-acts that 
the Kenyatta regime has engaged in frame Somalis and Muslims as the root-cause of 
insecurity in Kenya. Efforts to scapegoat ethnic and religious communities are political 
choices that are compounded by the reality of ethnic politics in Kenya. 
Identity Politics in Kenya 
Kenya has long been characterized as a deeply divisive multi-ethnic country. The 
government recognizes 43 ethnic groups, however, the Kikuyu have been the most 
powerful ethnic group since independence. Uhuru Kenyatta is not the first of his line to 
rule. His father Jomo Kenyatta, often heralded as the father of independent Kenya, 
consolidated power. Political elites became synonymous with Kikuyu. Political, 
economic, and social domination of the ethnic minority quickly became the norm. The 
promise by Jomo Kenyatta of a united Kenya, and an overly ambitious united East 
Africa, was supplanted by a conscious clandestine plan to engage in the manufacturing of 
two Kenyas. 
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Within years, Kikuyu spread outside of Nairobi and the Rift Valley Provinces. One area 
that experienced an influx of Kikuyu migrants was Mpeketoni in Lamu County. Lamu is 
historically an important Muslim region. In order to stifle a potential food crisis, the 
government settled Kikuyu. While the local MP, Madhubuti, favored the government 
policy, local citizens viewed this as an invasion.35 Kikuyu settlements in the 
predominantly Muslim Coast led to a conflict over land ownership. The new landowners 
were backed by the government and given deeds, while the Muslims, many of which 
view themselves as natives, were left with nothing.36 
While the decision to move Kikuyu to Mpeketoni has had dire political 
consequences, it was enshrined in the want to help the Coast. The Coast has historically 
been one of the most food insecure regions in Kenya. The Rift Valley is home to the 
Kikuyu and is also the breadbasket for the country. Jomo Kenyatta employed strategic 
logic to avoid a potential humanitarian disaster of a minority population. Kikuyu families 
in the Rift Valley and Central provinces, however, needed to have incentives to move to 
the coast. Guaranteed land ownership was the solution that the government used to 
persuade Kikuyu. It is important to note that in Tanzania, Kenya’s fraternal neighbor, 
Mwalimu Julius Nyerere forced Tanzanian citizens at gunpoint to load on to trucks and 
dropped them off in disparate regions of the country. This was a conscious move by the 
first president to help foster a national identity. This process did not occur in Kenya. 
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Unlike Tanzania, public good provision in Kenya has been predicated on ethnicity. 37 
The provision of security, and subsequent blame of insecurity, has fallen along ethnic 
lines. 
Terrorism in Kenya 
Al-Shabaab is not Kenya’s first experience with terrorism. February 1975, just 12 
years after Kenya became independent, explosions rocked a Nairobi nightclub. A local 
business was targeted near a Hilton in central Nairobi. Following the hotel explosion, 
Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, a socialist Kenyan politician, claimed he was targeted while in 
his car.38 Kenya seemed to be ill equipped to deal with the terror threat. No arrests were 
made in connection with these events. In early March, Kariuki was kidnapped and killed. 
The circumstances surrounding his abduction and subsequent murder were quite 
suspicious. The next attack came in 1980 when an Arab terror group bombed a hotel, 
again in Nairobi. The motivation for this attack was due to the Kenyan state allowed 
Israeli aircraft to use an airstrip to launch a raid in Kampala, Uganda, following a 
hijacking. 20 were killed and more than 80 were injured.39 One of the higher profile 
attacks occurred in 1998 in Nairobi, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. American embassies 
were targeted and resulted in hundreds of deaths. Al-Qaeda targeted both embassies 
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38 Derived from The Global Terrorism Database. 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=kenya&sa.x=0&sa.y=0&sa=Se
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39 C, Torchia, (2013, October 19). “Kenya mall attack echoes 1980 hotel 
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around 10:30am August, 7th 1998, using trucks filled with explosives.40 Mombasa was 
targeted in November of 2002 when an Israeli aircraft was targeted after takeoff from 
Moi International Airport. This attack was synchronized with another; Israeli tourists 
were targeted in a hotel-bombing killing 13 and injuring more than 70.41 These attacks, 
while deadly, reflect a form of terror disparate from Al-Shabaab. 
With the exception of the murder of Kariuki, the attacks were largely targeting 
non-Kenyans within Kenya. American and Israeli interests within Kenya were insecure, 
but Kenyans did not live with the very real threat of terror. That is not to say that Kenyan 
citizens were not perished in violent attacks. However, Kenyans that perished in these 
attacks did so because they worked in the hotels, embassy buildings, or were aboard 
targeted flights. That is to say, the level of the, at least perceived, “Kenyaness” or 
“Christianity” were not the driving force behind violence. Identity was a variable for 
these attacks, however, at a different level than that of recent terrorism. The attacks that 
took place in the 1970s-1990s were targeted because of their link to international politics 
that Kenyan citizens had no impact on. A new wave of terrorism associated with religion 
brought with it a new version of terror, one that is perceived to be preventable and 
conducted at the hands of the Muslim and Somali minorities. 
Al-Shabaab first became a threat to Kenyans in 2011, and continue remain a 
legitimate threat to Kenyan citizens. The attacks in Kenya spanning from 2011- 2014, 
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coincide with Operation Linda Nchi42, when the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) 
crossed the border into southern Somalia. Terrorism in Kenya pivoted from targeting 
western or Israeli interests and persons to targeting Kenya. The most high profile of 
which has been the September 2013 Westgate Mall attack. Almost 70 people were killed 
and nearly 200 injured. This attack touched all Kenyans, despite it occurring in an 
aristocratic neighborhood of Nairobi. Eyewitnesses reported non-Muslims primarily 
being targeted. While the Westgate shooting has garnered the attention of international 
media outlets and politicians alike, the majority of attacks have been located on the coast 
and in the Northeastern province. 
Attacks have primarily been located at the periphery of the state,. This coincides 
with what is known about insurgencies, which posit that ‘fragile state’; control is often 
absent along the hinterlands.43 Al-Shabaab engaged in attacks on small villages on the 
coast, or rock quarry sites in the north because these areas are accessible given the porous 
border and lack of state authority. Somalis in Kenya are predominately located in the 
Coast and North Eastern providences.44 Attackers take advantage of engaging Kenyans 
where the Somali populations are highest, and through the ‘weakest’ part of the state. 
This coincides with the analysis of Joel Barkan, a prominent scholar of Kenyan politics. 
Barkan argues “Mainly along the Indian Ocean coast, the home of most Kenyan 
Muslims... have long felt neglected by Nairobi, which they view as being controlled by 
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"upcountry" Kenyans”.45 The coastal and northern areas of Kenya are marginalized 
politically, and populations can be perceived to be at odds with greater Kenya. There is a 
high concentration of Muslims and Somalis in these areas, which Al-Shabaab takes full 
advantage of.  High-profile attacks such as Westgate are few and far between. The 
current trend is small-scale, yet deadly attacks of Kenyan citizens, often characterized by 
the exclusive targeting of non-Muslims. With all Kenyans living with the very real threat 
of Al-Shabaab, the Kenyan state has been forced to deal with insecurity. 
Kenya Reacts 
Explosions again rocked Nairobi and Mombasa in March of 2014; as a result in 
early April, Kenya launched ‘Operation Usalama46 Watch’. Under the guise of national 
security, the Somali-Kenyan community has been incriminated.47 The Somali-Kenyan 
enclave of Eastleigh, also known colloquially as “Little Mogadishu”, just east of Nairobi, 
was heavily targeted. Exact numbers are not possible given the lack of transparency of 
the Kenyan security apparatus, however, NGOs such as Amnesty International has 
reported thousands of Somalis and Somali-Kenyans have been arrested, with hundreds 
being forcibly repatriated to Somalia. Those arrested that could not produce proof of 
citizenship, including refugees, were moved into the Kakuma and Dadaab camps. This 
security operation illustrates how the Kenyan state treats Eastleigh; as if it were an 
extension of Somalia and not being a part of ‘real’ Kenya. Thus it is clear that, to the 
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state, those in Somali populated areas and refugee camps are not ‘real’ Kenyans. 
Somali-Kenyans are fundamentally distinct and dissimilar to that of ‘regular’ Kenyans. 
Kenyan Security forces have sought to ‘securitize’ Mombasa in a similar fashion 
to that of Eastleigh. Armed with weapons and legitimacy from the state, police arrested 
more than 200 during a 3 day operation that ended November 19, 2014th.  The target of 
the raids was the Minaa and Swafaa mosques. Under the purview of receiving 
‘intelligence’ that these places of worship were radicalizing youths to perpetrate attacks, 
police and KDF arrested those in and around the mosques. Although not as indiscriminate 
as the Eastleigh operation, locals have characterized these attacks as being solely against 
the predominately Muslim population of the coast. With attacks destroying the tourism 
industry in coastal Kenya, citizens have been crying out for the state to provide security. 
The answer to this yearning has resulted in further marginalization and the militarization 
of the Coast. 
The most deadly attack since the Westgate mall incident occurred June 2014. The 
day after the second Mpeketoni attack, Uhuru Kenyatta took the stage and blamed ethnic 
rivals for the attacks. Despite Al-Shabaab claiming responsibility, thus threatening the 
region and its citizens, Kenyatta claimed Islamic terrorists were not the ones who carried 
out the attacks: 
The attack in Lamu was well planned, orchestrated and politically motivated 
ethnic violence against a Kenyan community, with the intention of profiling and 
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evicting them for political reasons. This, therefore, was not an Al Shabaab 
terrorist attack.48 
Engaging in ‘the ethnic blame-game’ serves two functions. First, Mpketoni being 
located near a popular tourist destination, Kenyatta wishes to quell any concerns over 
possibly terrorist threats. By rejecting (and discrediting) the claims made by Al-Shabaab 
the Kenyan government is able to assert that terror is not a problem for tourists and the 
revenue they bring. The American and British government have issues travel warnings 
urging their citizens to not travel to Kenya; specifically Coastal Kenya. The Coast 
province is especially vulnerable to a slump in revenue being that it accounts for the 
majority of its economy. 
Secondly, suggesting ethnicity as the cause of the attack allows Uhuru Kenyatta 
to protect his interests. Mpeketoni is predominately Kikuyu, Kenya’s largest and most 
powerful ethnic group. Kenyatta, also being Kikuyu, played the ethnic card because he 
was posturing to the ethnic group, which ensured his winning election. Considering 
Nairobi is predominately Kikuyu, why would Kenyatta not employ ethnic rhetoric during 
the Westgate attack? In addition to being the capital, Nairobi is the economic center of 
Kenya. Any attack on Nairobi is an attack on the country, and as such cannot be framed 
as being a place purely for Kikuyus. Furthermore, it is not politically advantageous for 
Kenyatta to outright blame Somalis or to snub a large minority population. Despite 
Nairobi being a symbol of the country, majority of Kikuyus live in Nairobi. Stating 
Nairobi attacks as attacks on Kikuyus does not provide a political advantage in the capital 
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more so than Kenyatta already has. A Kikuyu controlled Mpeketoni was constructed 
by Uhuru’s father. 
Kenya’s first president Jomo Kenyatta settled Kikuyus in the small coastal town 
in the 1960s. Those who did not have homes in the Rift Valley or Central provinces were 
relocated to Mpeketoni, and given land deeds, something the local communities did not 
possess. Today the Kikuyu community represents a growing bloc of voters in Lamu 
County and population trends point to their growing influence along the coast. 
Supporting the most powerful ethnic group in the country, coupled with the added bonus 
of Kikuyus growing in influence delivers political advantages to Kenyatta (Uhuru). 
The binary of either being Al-Shabaab or ethnically motivated violence is 
misleading. There is no evidence to support the claim that being a member of Al-Shabaab 
excludes him49 from engaging in ethnic violence. Eyewitness accounts of the Mpeketoni 
attacks coincide with recent Al-Shabaab attacks in Wajir, Mandera, and on the Westgate 
mall. It is entirely possible, even likely, that those who have been radicalized by any 
organization would use tactics and methods learned and apply them to strategically 
important domestic areas. Kenyatta has not provided evidence, although victim blaming 
under the guise of ‘intelligence failures’ have shown to be a main tactic of Uhuru’s. 
In the weeks following the Mpeketoni attack, the governor of Lamu, Issa Timamy 
was arrested. This coincides with the state’s response of the attacks being perpetrated by 
local political networks. Framing of this instance of insecurity, as being an example of 
‘the politics of opportunity’ for rivals of Kikuyus (and therefore the state), unofficially 
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indicts ethnic minorities in Lamu County. Timamy is a member of the United Democratic 
Forum, an opposition party. 
Societal Securitization 
Anti-Somali policies are securitizing Kenyan “society”. The society in question is 
not the nation, or anyone born or immigrated to Kenya in hopes of a better life. Instead 
the society is what Buzan (1991) refers to as the audience. The Kenyatta regime panders 
to the wealthy, and politically important Kikuyus. Kenya has experienced influxes of 
refugees, mostly coming from Somalia. Somalis in Kenya have been marginalized since 
independence. Inaptitude of the Kenyan state, as well as its structure, ensures that 
building mass camps that house hundreds of thousands of refugees, but not citizens 
solves the ‘refugee question’. There lacks a Somali pathway to citizenship within Kenya. 
During times of ethnic polarization, and even civil war, offering citizenship to a 
marginalized population intersects with peace, as it did in Côte d’Ivoire.50 Instead of 
using legal state institutions and policies, Kenyatta’s Kenya seeks to securitize ‘true’ 
Kenyan identity. He does this by pushing his policies in an area of extreme politics, 
which require extreme, yet “necessary” responses to Somali-Kenyans. 
Assigning blame to governors of attacked regions is societal securitization. The 
indictment of Timany of Lamu, falls in line with the very recent attacks in Wajir and 
Mandera. Kenyatta addressed the nation in early December and alluded to the fact that it 
is the responsibility of “All Kenyans” to help with security. Security falls to the shoulders 
of the state. By sharing responsibility for security, and therefore insecurity, Kenyatta 
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shifts the burden back to communities that are victimized the most. Kikuyu elites share 
the notion that ‘true’ Kenyans do not attack each other, and they do not aid the enemy. If 
they do, their places of worship will be targeted and their locally elected officials will 
face criminal charges. Kenya has not been immune to ethnic violence. Using coded 
language and rhetoric, in addition to overt policies that target marginalized non-Kikuyu 
populations, protects perceptions of Kenyan identity. The newest attacks in Northern 
Kenya have forced Kenyatta to declare a “War” on Al-Shabaab. As long as Al-Shabaab 
remains a threat to the Kenyan people, Kenyatta and other Kikuyu elites will use existing 
security apparatuses of the state to protect Kenyans, instead of building a nation and 
forging a united Kenya. 
A common saying in Kenya is that ‘Kenya is country of 42 tribes, without a 
nation’. Due to historical and structural variables, nation building has been challenging at 
best for post-colonial states. Within the African context, examples of true nation building 
are few and far between. The trend has been to build a state, characterized by centralized 
power. Kenya has the daunting task of continuing to build a state in the face of a rising 
insurgency. At times of insecurity politics in Kenya relies on ethnicity. Electoral violence 
of 2007-2008 was obviously along ethnic lines, and ethnic groups were mobilized top-
down. Recent attacks, whether by Al-Shabaab or Al-Shabaab trained ‘ethnic thugs’, 
represent the most insecure Kenyans have been since the electoral violence. 
The Kenyan government engages in an arbitrary fearfulness against ethnic 
Somalis in Nairobi, and beyond. Kenyan politicians, military leaders, and other elites 
have failed to answer to the systematic and structural violence against innocent Somalis. 
The KDF, backed by the Kenyatta regime, receives a blank check that they cash in the 
 
 
	  
42 
name of exterminating “terrorists”. The securitization that Somali-Kenyans and Muslims 
experience is ethnic profiling. Mass arrests, predicated on baseless claims, perpetuate the 
prevailing narrative that Somalis are a threat to national security. Living amongst a 
particular community, having a specific sounding surname, or practicing a religion that 
most Kenyans do not practice, is justification enough be treated like an enemy of the 
state. 
Kenyan government officials control the national narrative on security. They 
constantly attempt to persuade the population of a specific single cause for the insecurity: 
the influx of Somalis into the country. The ‘true’ cause of insecurity is of course much 
more nuanced than political elites would have Kenyans, and the international community, 
believe. However, the construction of ‘two Kenyas’ is grounded in identity politics, and 
is manifested through official policies. One of the most egregious policies the Kenyan 
government engages in the refugee camps in in Kakuma and Dadaab. 
Kenya houses two of the largest refugee camps in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
population of the camps themselves is ethnically homogenous, and the Dadaab refugee 
camp is almost exclusively a detention center for Somalis. If Somalis are viewed as the 
cause of insecurity, then the Dadaab camp is viewed as a solution. For years the camp has 
been sprawling into a town of its own. Somalis risk their lives in hopes of a better future 
for themselves and their family. Kenya being the economic powerhouse of East Africa 
shines like a beacon for the region. People walk through the desert controlled by Al-
Shabaab in hopes of reaching the promise of economic opportunity, and to possibly 
become part of a community that provides some of life’s most basic necessities. 
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However, after risking their lives by trekking through a “failed state”, they are thrown 
into camps indiscriminately—camps which are forgotten by the government. Not only do 
these camps house Somali refugees, but also anyone with Somali heritage runs the risk of 
being detained and transported to Dadaab. 
The Dadaab refugee camp is a manifestation of societal securitization. Security 
alone does not exist, according to Buzan and Waever security is breathed into existence. 
An issue becomes an issue of security if it is labeled as such. For this to occur a threat 
must be poised against a referent object—something that is to be preserved. This pushed 
security into a realm of exceptional politics, which requires an exceptional reaction. 
When an issue becomes securitized the government must act. To do nothing would be 
neglectful; governments ought to answer to issues of insecurity. However, the 
government itself manufactures the insecurity that it is attempting to solve. Empirical 
insecurity—that is insecurity in actuality, and not just manufactured—is difficult to 
prove. Descending voices run the risk of being portrayed as being ‘soft on terrorism’. 
There is no evidence to substantiate the claim that Somalis in Kenya make Kenya more 
insecure, but the speech acts that the government engages in creates a new reality for 
Kenya. 
‘Securing’ Refugees 
Security concerning individuals within Africa is often rooted policies of countries. 
Refugee policy is one of the few areas of security research, which concerns the policies, 
and reaction of a state, and how they impact people. Refugees, and how countries react to 
the possibility of them crossing their borders, are particularly important to African states. 
Subject? Finds that 28 percent of the world’s refugee population is African, despite only 
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12 percent of the world population being from Africa51. Being displaced by either 
conflict, as was the case of Rwandan and South Sudanese refugees, or driven by famine 
often caused by state collapse, as was the case of Somali refugees, states who find people 
who walk to their borders have the daunting dilemma of how to proceed. States have 
decided to securitize refugees, often in camps. Some states are able to integrate refugees 
better than others. Tanzania has been more effective then Kenya at passing citizenship 
laws, and developing the areas refugees occupy.52 Of all the methods available in the 
arsenal of states, it is logical that securitization would be appropriate to address the 
refugee question. Salehyan and Gleditsch find that refugees flooding into a host country 
run the risk of spreading conflict53. Framing refugees as threats instead of victims of civil 
war perpetuates the narrative of Somalis being intrinsically dangerous to the country. 
Refugee influx into Kenya is the result of an unpredictable and dangerous 
situation in Somalia. Instead of investing in housing and incorporating the refugee 
population into greater Kenya society, the government relegates refugees to remote areas 
on the countries’ periphery. The government fears that, if left in greater Kenya, Al-
Shabaab may recruit ethnic Somalis into their ranks.54 To combat this dangerous 
potential, the government concentrates the Somali population to camps that were 
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designed to house a fraction of the population that Dadaab camp currently houses. Life 
support is a constant struggle and the government has not made the refugee camps a 
priority. 
In the eyes of the Kenyan government, refugees are viewed as a threat to national 
security. The lack of provision of some of the most basic necessities of life runs the risk 
of ‘blowback’. Young refugee populations that do not have secured access to food, water, 
and shelter are ripe for radicalization. The government fears a radicalized Somali 
population, while creating the conditions for Al-Shabaab to radicalize. Refugees as a 
threat are part of the reality that is being shaped by the government. This narrative does 
not limit the humanitarian crisis that refugees in Kenya are experiencing. Since Kenya 
has neglected protect human life inside their borders, NGOs fill the void. 
International organizations are forced to act when the Kenyan government does 
not. Ironically, this creates more animosity between the host communities and the refugee 
population. Institutions seek to lend a helping hand to the incredibly vulnerable refugee 
population. Funding flows from donors directly to the refugee camps. These funds, while 
necessary to save lives, create tension among the local population, which is often 
neglected by the same donors. Kenya is not unique in this regard. Refugees in Cambodia 
have been given more economic opportunities.55 An influx of refugees means more 
competition for work. Organizations prefer to hire from a pool of individuals who are 
perceived to be in more need than non-refugees. This practice is the by-product of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Gleditsch, Nils. P., Ragnhild Nordås and Idean Salehyan. (2007), "Climate Change" 
and Grigg-Saito, D., Och, S., Liang, S., Toof, R., & Silka, L. "Building on the strengths 
of a Cambodian refugee community through community-based outreach." Health 
Promotion Practice, (2008).  
 
 
 
	  
46 
Kenyan governments’ refusal to effectively incorporate refugees into a democratic and 
inclusive society. Since this practice also has the added benefit of creating more tension, 
it aids the government’s campaign that Somalis are inherently dangerous and pit ‘true’ 
Kenyans against the intrusive refugees. 
Creating Fear 
The reality created is one where the government frames their actions as absolutely 
necessary, for to do nothing is to jeopardize the existence of a peaceful Kenya. 
Extraordinary politics often means undemocratic policies. Somalis being scapegoated and 
forcibly assigned to refugee camps is of course unbecoming of a democracy. Fear is a 
tool that can be employed to justify undemocratic and exceptional politics. The 
audience—non-Somali, Christian Kenyans—is the recipient of the propaganda that 
Somalis and Muslims are synonymous with terrorist. The threat that is framed by the 
government is aimed at the very identity of Kenya. The country, and its citizens, is in 
jeopardy—so goes the strategic logic of the authorities. Those with power frame the 
threat as a crisis that supersedes potentially competing crises. Authorities need the 
audience to accept the threat legitimate. If the audience does not share the sense of 
urgency, the threat will cease to allow undemocratic and exceptional politics. 
The problem constructed is that Somalis represent an existential danger to Kenyan 
security. Exceptional problems require exceptional solutions. The Kenyan security arm, 
predominately made up of the KDF, extends the full might of its capabilities against, 
which are diametrically opposed to a free, open, and inclusive society. Securitization then 
becomes a paradox. In the names of national security, and protecting a democratic 
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society, the government scales back democratic processes and scapegoats ethnic and 
religious minorities. Through the power of identity construction, deconstruction, and 
shaping, national security is protected and the window of terrorism appears to close. Al-
Shabaab is Somali and Muslim; therefore Somalis and Muslims are the cause of the 
increased insecurity in the country. Innocent families answer the doors that are being torn 
down by security forces. Individuals who are Kenyan born citizens are needlessly 
harassed. At times they are arrested or detained without cause. These are the costs that 
Somalis are paying for in exchange for a free and peaceful Kenya. However, the free and 
peaceful Kenya that the authorities strive for is not for every Kenyan; it is predominantly 
for Kikuyu and Christians. 
Thousands of Kenyans have been arrested in operations designed to provide 
security, with an added by-product of perpetuating the governments’ narrative. Numerous 
NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented several 
accounts of abuses. Kenyan security forces have engaged beating and demanding money 
from Somalis. Security operations have caused unintended consequences. Instead of 
providing security, these abuses have triggered Al-Shabaab to entrench themselves in 
Kenyan communities, and to conduct attacks in retaliation.56 Continued abuse of citizens 
must be constantly legitimized. Kenyan Senator Boni Khalwale has attempted to 
construct a link between Al-Shabab and all ethnic Somalis (Khalwale in Trouble, 2015).57 
It would be advantageous for the government to go after individuals who are responsible 
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for attacks. However, the government is more concerned with the arbitrary targeting and 
profiling of ethnic Somalis than they are with bringing criminals and terrorists to justice. 
Kenyan politicians have engaged in anti-Somali discourse. After the horrific 
killings at Garissa University College	  Ahmednasir Abdullahi, a city lawyer is quoted as 
claiming, “The attack in Garissa is obviously the work of Kenyan Somalis. Let us not 
blame Somalia’s Al-Shabaab. This is local”.58 Despite attackers of Garissa being Kenyan 
born, the government seeks to build a fence along the Kenyan-Somali border.59 This has 
brought criticism from William Ruto, a prominent member of the Kenyan opposition and 
current Deputy President of Kenya, sees parallels with U.S. policies stating “The way 
America changed after 9/11 is the way Kenya will change after Garissa".60 Ruto’s 
comments reflect the common narrative of blaming an entire ethnic community instead of 
the real causes of insecurity. A border will not secure Kenya, as a corrupt and inept 
security force are used to accepting bribes. Even if Kenya has the ability to build a fence 
or to keep out Somalis, the actions and lack of professionalization of ensure the increased 
insecurity in Kenya.  
Kenyan security forces lack true operational capacity to conduct counter-terror 
operations. The problem for this lies in two crucial components to a sound counter-
insurgency strategy. First, security forces require effective equipment and training. A 
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professionalized security apparatus has the correct tools to conduct security operations. 
Weapons, vehicles, uniforms, and other equipment set them apart from their adversaries. 
Ill-equipped forces with limited training are not able to conduct counter-terror operations. 
Military capacity can be used as a proxy to measure state strength.61 States that do not 
provide security, due to lack of capacity or incentive, are institutionally weak. It is no 
surprise that Kenyan security forces have limited operational capability due to Kenya 
ranking in the top 20 most fragile states eight times in the past ten years. 
Despite being the economic powerhouse of East Africa, Kenya has not made a 
credible commitment to security. In FY 2013 the Kenyan government spent only 2% of 
their GDP on defense.62 Despite a rising insurgency and the increased activity of a 
terrorist organization, the Kenyan government has decided not to invest in their defense. 
A security force ill prepared to confront Al-Shabaab on a tactical level must resort to its 
coercive capability characterized by its exercise of force. 
The local population is critical to any counter-insurgency or counter-terror 
campaign. Within the American context, the battle for “Hearts and minds” is viewed as 
important to the kinetic fight. Some American military leaders have even gone so far as 
to describe the local population as the key to fighting an insurgency. Abuses by Kenyan 
security forces limit their capability to bring the fight to Al-Shabaab. The Kenyan 
government must rely on communities, which have high concentrations of ethnic Somalis 
and Kenyans. However, the economic and social marginalization, coupled with the 
scapegoating, of Somalis pits Somalis against ‘normal’ Kenyans. Ethnic Somalis and 
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Muslims are less likely to cooperate and with security forces that target their 
communities. Al-Shabaab attacks are often along religious lines in order to strengthen 
their ties with Muslim and Somali Kenyans. In return, when security forces blindly paint 
Somalis and Muslims with a broad brush, they are driving people into the arms of Al-
Shabaab. 
Security forces must always keep the interests of the community they are serving 
at the forefront of their mandate. The current situation in Kenya has created an 
environment where minority communities of ethnic Somalis and Muslims must grip with 
not only Al-Shabaab’s growing presence, but also the actions of security forces that are 
directed to protect the community. There is much skepticism surrounding the 
effectiveness of community policing in Kenya. For one it is not entirely clear how 
security forces should be recruited and deployed. A Luo police officer deployed to the 
Coast, or a Kikuyu soldier conducting an operation in the North Eastern province may 
not be motivated to provide security to a community they do not belong to.  
Uhuru Kenyatta’s Approach to Security 
President Uhuru Kenyatta approaches security in Kenya due to the circumstances 
that brought him to power. The 2007 national election ensured President Mwai Kibaki’s 
victory, but was underscored by violence. Electoral violence was experienced due to an 
incredibly close election in which the winner enjoys the spoils of governance. Thousands 
were killed and more than 2 million became displaced as a result of the violence.63  
Kenyatta was at the center of controversy. The International Criminal Court (ICC) 
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indicted Kenyatta as being an organizer of the mungiki, politicized gangs, which 
brought havoc during the crisis. Prosecutors at The Hague were forced to drop the 
charges due to a lack of evidence.64 While the ICC could not successfully bring Kenyatta 
to justice, civil society groups in Kenya (especially those located on the coast) posit that 
the current President is involved in egregious human rights abuses.65  
Despite the ICC and civil society groups viewing Kenyatta as having blood on his 
hands, he was elected President of Kenya in 2013. To those critical of the Kenyatta 
regime, his name is synonymous with violence. The violent, predominately Kikuyu, 
mungiki gangs were mobilized top-down. These groups operated in a Mafioso like 
fashion before the election, however, uncertainty surrounding who the winner would be 
(who would have access to state resources) led elites to take the reins off of the violent 
gang. 66  
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CHAPTER 3: SECURITY FRAMES OF THE ‘SECOND’ KENYA 
Where as the previous chapter investigate and explains security from the point of 
view of the government of Kenya, this chapter expounds on how citizens of Coastal 
Kenya frame security. Securitization employed by the government is done so under the 
guise of protecting the masses, while benefiting the political elites. While government 
policies and actions are important for analyzing the construction of security, it is only 
half of the story. The other halves, of course, are the citizens themselves. Are the frames 
and narratives perpetuated by the government reflected in the general population? Due to 
the limits of the interview sample, this question is outside of the scope of this thesis. It is 
possible to ascertain, given the sample provided, is whether the government is acting in 
the best interests of the very communities that face actual insecurity? To answer this 
question, 25 semi-structured interviews were collected in June of 2014 in Malindi Kenya. 
How do individuals, who face the real threat of violence, frame security? 
Throughout the summer of 2014, Kenya’s coast has feel victim to several attacks. 
Tourists, and locals have been targeted alike. As a result, Western states have issued 
travel warnings to the once sought after paradise destination. While travel warnings 
garner international media attention, Kenyans have been the victims of the bloodiest of 
attacks. Without the input of the local community, the picture of security is incomplete. 
The interviews collected present two frames of security. First, insecurity can 
cause economic devastation. Coastal Kenya is especially vulnerable to fluctuations of 
tourism revenue. The second major frame is responsibility of the national government. 
Responsibility has two dimensions. The first being that citizens recognize the government 
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in Nairobi has the ability to provide security, yet do not. While it is true that security 
apparatus of Kenya is underfunded, and unprofessional, respondents realize that these 
problems are the fault of the government. 
This chapter has two major components. First I explain, through data provided by 
interviews, the two major components of security that is most salient. Next I address 
some surprises from the interviews. Respondents tended to not invoke religion as a main 
driver of the insecurity. This is interesting given the heavy religious and ethnic overtones 
the government involves itself with. Table 1 depicts the most common frames and 
associated claims.67 
Economic Security 
Comparative to other countries in East Africa, Kenya is wealthy. The East African 
Community (EAC), which consists of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda 
has generally enjoyed economic prowess. If the EAC is a rising tower, Kenya is the 
foundation. The port in Mombasa serves not only Kenya, but the region. Realizing the 
importance of the Mombasa port, Uhuru Kenytta along with other leaders, agreed to build 
a railway connecting Mombasa to Kigali.68 Mombasa’s port is not the sole reason for the 
strong economic position Kenya is in. Historically, Kenya has experienced a more 
privatized economy than its neighbors. Ujamaa failed to yield any economic results other 
than a strong centrally planned economy.69 Realizing the importance tourism plays into 
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the economic activity of the Coast, Muslim citizens conflate terrorist attacks with dips in 
income. 
Natural resources such as pristine beaches attract thousands of tourists to Coastal 
Kenya every year. The Coast is one of the more underdeveloped regions in Kenya. Jobs 
and other economic activity is predicated on tourism. Half of the interviewees mentioned 
when the season is low their jobs are cut. Kenyan labor laws do not require minimum 
wage. Neither full time nor part time jobs are guaranteed. As one worker at a restaurant 
put it “When there are no Wazungu70 there are no jobs.71 
Due to the importance of tourism in the coasts’ economy, nearly all of the 
interviewees reported that the Nairobi based government has done a poor job developing 
the coast economically. Of the 25 interviewed, nearly all mentioned employment 
opportunities as being a paramount issue for the coast. Mombasa, being particularly 
important for Kenya as well as other East African countries, has the fortune of housing 
the biggest port in the region. Smaller towns along the coast rely on tourism. Tourism 
brings with it not only revenue for local businesses, but also the chance for employment. 
During the offseason, many hotel workers engage in other forms of work. This can range 
from subsistence agriculture in the more rural regions, to fishing. Of the men that were 
interviewed (about half of the 25), 6 of them fished in the offseason, however, did not 
feel that it was adequate to sustain a living. Gender seemed to not be a factor in that of 
the women interviewed, 5 identified without their current job they would be unable to 
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send their children to school. These secondary jobs are not intended to be a sustainable 
source of income throughout the year. Perceptions of insecurity can lower prospects for 
tourism. Travel warnings issued by countries in Europe and North America can have 
detrimental effects to the economy of coastal Kenya. With excellent bio-diversity and 
pristine white sand beaches, Kenya can read the benefits of these scarce natural 
resources. Akama Finds that insecurity, whether perceived or actual, lowers employment 
prospects for the region and has the ability to shrink the economy of the country72. 
Security being linked to tourism economics may be a consequence of the research site. 
Malindi has historically been an Italian tourist destination. Of the attacks, which took 
place, none were in Malindi proper. While many residents of Malindi have contacts in 
Lamu and Mombasa areas, how they view the potential impacts of an insecure coast are 
framed with employment. The coast is, however, especially susceptible to tourist 
fluctuations in a time of insecurity. While experienced tourists tend to downplay terror 
threats73, the possibility of new revenue being introduced to the region is severely 
limited. 
Nairobi’s Responsibility 
Like citizens of any modern country, coastal Kenyans place the burden of security 
on the state. It is in this sense that the state is viewed as a parent, who is supposed to 
provide the basic goods in order for a life to be fulfilling. A security apparatus is an 
umbrella of which all citizens are to be afforded. This normative conceptualization of 
security is widespread amongst coastal Kenyans. It is in this sense that security can be 
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viewed as a way to operationalize a Kenya’s perceived ability to provide governance. In 
the face of the credible threats, Kenyan citizens look to Nairobi. All interviewees expect 
the government to provide security, and all but 3 stated the government is not fulfilling 
this obligation. More than half of interviews place personal blame on Uhuru Kenyatta. 
Not only is the state responsible for the provision of security, it is thought that the 
state is actively driving insecurity along the coast. This is due to the Kenyan Defense 
Forces (KDF) being actively engaged in operations within Somalia. Citizens of the coast 
reject Kenyatta’s assertion that his ethnic rivals are to blame for the slew of attacks. 
When queried what the biggest threat on the coast is, Al-Shabaab is mentioned. Several 
men, and most women who were interviewed, declared that if the KDF were to cease 
their missions and operations in Somalia, Al-Shabaab would limit their presence on the 
coast. Kenya has experienced attacks outside of the coastal region. Infamously, the 
Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi shook the country. As a response, Kenya has increased 
the KDF presence in Somalia. The Kenya-Somali border has been closed since 2011. 
The Kenya-Somali border remains a contentious topic in political discourse. Politicians in 
Madera and Nairobi claim that Kenya will build a wall along the entirety of the border.74 
Kenya, however, neither has the capacity or the finances to build a fence along the entire 
border. Assuming Kenya did, it would not limit attacks on Kenyan soil, given that 
Kenyan citizens have conducted attacks after being radicalized. 20 interviewees were 
concerned that they would not be able to contact family or business partners if Kenya 
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limits the ability to travel to and from Somalia.75 A border fence would surely limit the 
freedom of ethnic Somalis and Muslims. Moreover, by the government engaging in the 
speech-act of planning to build a border fence, ethnic Somalis and Muslims live in 
increased fear. 17 of the 25 interviewees claimed that just by the government publically 
announcing their plan to build a fence conjures fear for reprisals should there be an 
altercation near a border crossing.76 
A common theme that interviewees mention is the ongoing operations by the 
Kenyan Defense forces and Air Force in Somalia. 23 interviewees claimed that Kenya 
can stop Al-Shabaab by if Kenya would stop ground and air operations in Somalia. This 
sentiment is shared along the Coast. Instead of ethnic Somalis and Muslims being the 
driver of terrorism, these responses reverse the causal arrow and shift the blame to the 
Kenyan government as causing their insecurity. There is no one single cause of insecurity 
and terrorism in Kenya, and there is little evidence to support the claim that Al-Shabaab 
would stop operations in Kenya if Kenya would not engage Al-Shabaab in Somalia. What 
is of interest is the fact that citizens turn around and blame the security actions of the 
Kenyan military, when confronted with the notion that their communities cause 
insecurity. Further empirical research is needed to determine the validity of the claim that 
Kenya brings terrorism to its soil. 
Unexpected Findings 
Of the differences and cleavages, which could be mobilized, there are some 
surprises. With the coast being predominately Muslim in a Christian majority country, it 
would be expected that discourse on religious differences would be employed. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Semi-structured interviews. June, 2014. Malindi, Kenya. 
76	  Semi-structured interviews. June, 2014. Malindi, Kenya.	  
 
 
	  
58 
Surprisingly, no interviewee mentioned the possibility of a Christian hegemony being 
employed in Nairobi. There was only one interviewee, which did not identify as a 
Muslim. The rest of the lot did not mention mistreatment or marginalization of Kenyan 
Muslims. While the coast does remain more than 90% Muslim, there may lack a critical 
mass for political mobilization. In certain ethnic cleavages are mobilized politically in 
Malawi and not in Zambia due to the proportions of the groups being a higher percent of 
the population in Malawi as opposed to Zambia.77 Furthermore, security may be viewed 
as not being a tenant of Islam. When the Quran was written there was no sense of any 
Westphalian state system, so it is logical that religious justification for a state to provide 
security is lacking. Rhetoric and discourse of justice, however, is popular amongst coastal 
Muslims. This is not an East African phenomenon; in Northern Nigeria, Muslims frame 
democracy and freedom of religion as a form of justice. 78 While si haki (Kiswahili for no 
justice) is used as way to describe traditional Nairobi-coast relations, of which security is 
a fact, it is not generally declared as a Muslim trope. 
Instead of religion being a major cleavage of interest, geography is a common 
theme that is discussed. All but 5 interviewees referred to those from other parts of Kenya 
as being from “Up- country”. When queried as to what up-country meant, the prevailing 
definition of an up-country Kenyan was someone from Nairobi, and usually referenced 
being them as being in seats of power. Two individuals went so far as to mention up-
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country Kenyans having special privileges in the western provinces.79 Geography is 
linked to ethnicity. Ethnic groups tend to exist as enclaves within urban and rural areas. It 
is beneficial, as it is clandestine, to mention geographical differences as a hidden 
meaning for ethnicity. This gives the belief that “the ethnic card” is not being played, 
while still being able to criticize a select group of individuals. 
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CONCLUSION 
The central argument that I have argued is that security varies among the Kenyan 
government and its citizens. Kenyan authorities extend the security apparatus of the state 
to protect their political interests. By blaming and scapegoating Somalis and Muslims the 
government has the benefit of appearing to be concerned with the security of the country, 
while at the same time protecting a privileged powerful ethnic group, the Kikuyu. 
Variations between official Kenyan security policy and perceptions of security are great, 
yet they are intrinsically linked. Realizing that the state is the entity that is to provide 
security is a facet of modern nation-states. 
Citizens from Laos to Sweden seek security. Some states are better equipped to 
provide security than others. States respond to incentives, and as such, if there are no 
institutions in place to hold governments accountable, they will not be encouraged to 
keep the entire population safe. Democracies are better equipped to provide security, 
among other public goods, due to the possibility that if politicians do not hold up what 
they ought to do—ensure security—then they run the risk of being voted out. 
Ostensibly Kenya is a democracy, however, like many post-colonial countries 
democratization is a one step forward, two steps back process. Electoral violence of 
2007/08 illustrates how elections are incredibly important within Kenya. The issue was 
that elections were more important than obeying the rules of the game. When 
“democrats” are desperate, they may result to manipulating ethnicity for personal gain. 
While the current securitization process in Kenya is not a fate of ‘winner takes all’, 
leaders are responding to incentives they face. It is more advantageous for Kenyatta to 
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solidify base support of Christians and Kikuyu than it is to engage in constructive 
dialogue. There is no silver bullet to cure Kenya of Al-Shabaab, however, standing by 
and scapegoating the communities that live with threats from Al-Shabaab will only drive 
more Somalis and Muslims into the arms of Al-Shabaab. 
A political blame-game is being engaged by elites in Nairobi. President Uhuru 
Kenyatta was quick to blame ethnic rivals, and not Al-Shabaab for the attacks on 
Mpeketoni, a manufactured Kikuyu stronghold. This serves the function of taking 
advantage of a situation in which he, and other elites, stands to gain. Despite Al-Shabaab 
claiming responsibility for the slew of attacks in Mombasa and Lamu, political and ethnic 
rivals, engage in discourse, which does little to improve security. The Kenyan case 
illustrates how politics remains very much ethnic and divisive. Discourse surrounding 
unity and a Kenyan nation does exist, however, if the government is not able to provide 
security to the entirely of the electorate. National identity is only as important as the 
spoils, which can be gained. Until Kenya is able to cultivate institutions that incentivize 
elites to stop ethnic profiling, Somalis and Muslims will not enjoy security from Al-
Shabaab and human rights abuses alike. 
The interviews yield some expected results. First, security and economic 
considerations are linked. This is because during times of insecurity, the coast has 
experienced fewer tourists visiting. Travel security warnings from the United Kingdom 
and the United States cripples the economy of Coastal Kenya. While it is true that the 
government in Nairobi also feels the pain of such powerful Western countries whether 
the coast thrives or struggles is predicated on tourism. Second, security is the sole 
responsibility of the Kenyan national government. Insecurity is viewed as being a 
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provision of the state. During times of insecurity, as was the case during the summer of 
2014, citizens of coastal Kenya placed blame on the Nairobi based government. 
What is surprising is how Islam is important to citizens personally, yet but is not 
invoked with regards to security policy. This could be due to a lack of a critical mass of 
Muslims. Despite Muslims being heavily concentrated in the Coast and North Eastern 
Provinces—relative to the rest of the country—they realize that a gaining a winning 
coalition, nationally, is nearly impossible. This rationalist explanation is not all-inclusive. 
Religion (specifically Islam) in Kenya exists in a space where it can be molded and 
shaped to guide political decisions, albeit not about security. Security exists in a space 
that citizens contend should be provided to all of Kenya. 
Finally, this study has potential methodological implications. Insecurity in Africa 
is not a phenomenon that is unique to Kenya or East Africa. From Boko Haram in 
Northern Nigeria, to the insurgency in Azawad in Northern Mali, citizens live in states of 
insecurity. Securitization theory has the ability to travel to various parts of Africa and 
beyond. Chad and Cameroon have committed to the defeat of Boko Haram, and both 
have passed bans on Muslim dress.80 Securitization theory may have the ability to explain 
other conflicts in Africa, and beyond, but ‘Securitization’ as a theory needs to be further 
developed, to test its ability to travel. This study may serve as groundwork to learn more 
about how individuals view their parent government. Efficacy of governance is in the eye 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 “Cameroon Bans Islamic Face Veil” BBC Africa. (Jul. 16 2015) Retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33553041, and “Chad Bans Islamic Face Veil 
After Suicide Attack” BBC Africa. (Jun. 17 2015). Retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33166220 
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of the citizen. There is no substitute for local populations and their notions of security 
and governance. 
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